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Are People Selfish or Cooperative? Research on the voluntary provision of public goods must 
come to grips with this simple but still unanswered question about the fundamental nature of 
humankind. (Ledyard 1995, p.120) 
 
1 Introduction 
A consensus has emerged among researchers on voluntary provision of public goods 
that people are conditionally cooperative;1 in experiments, participants contribute 
the more the more others contribute even if free-riding is a dominant strategy. 
However, social preferences seem to exhibit a selfish bias, as conditional 
contributions increase less than fully proportionally with those by others 
(Fischbacher et al. 2001). 
It is a well-documented stylized fact that voluntary contributions decline 
with repetition (Ledyard 1995, p.121). Various theories have been advanced to 
explain this phenomenon. Traditional hypotheses include strategic play in early 
stages (Andreoni, 1988; Sonnemans et al, 1999) or errors that diminish over time 
(Andreoni, 1995; Palfrey and Prisbey, 1997). The aforementioned selfish bias in 
conditional cooperation could cause the decline, too, if it induces a downward spiral 
of contribution adjustments.2 
The experiment reported in this article is designed to analyze the 
contribution decline in an interactive repeated public goods game.3 Our setup, 
described in detail in section (2), elicits expectations on others’ contributions. Our 
treatment variable is the information feedback on partners’ contributions. In the 
control treatment, strategic play is impossible as no information is divulged. 
                                                           
1 C.f. Croson, 1998; Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman, 1999; Ockenfels, 1999; Keser and van Winden, 
2000; Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001; Brandts and Schram, 2001; Levati and Neugebauer, 2004; 
and Croson, Fatas and Neugebauer, in press.  
2 Andreoni’s (1988) observation of a restart effect renders an alternative learning hypothesis impossible. 
3 In contrast to the one-shot strategy method (‘cold’) applied by Fischbacher et al., we study conditional 
cooperation with spontaneous decisions (‘hot’). Experimental evidence on different behavior in hot and 
cold experiments was reported by Brosig, Weimann and Yang, 2003.  
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The data, reported in section (3), favor the hypothesis that downward 
adaptation of contributions due to selfish-biased preferences causes declining 
contributions over the competing hypotheses. Section (4) concludes.  
 
2 Experimental Design 
The paper examines behavior in a 10-rounds 3-person voluntary contribution 
mechanism in a partners design. In every round, each subject was given an 
endowment (50 experimental currency units) which could voluntarily be contributed 
toward a public good, or be kept to be consumed as a private good. The marginal 
per-capita return from the public good was one half. Under standard assumptions, 
thus, free-riding is predicted. Subjects’ expectations (guesses) about the sum of 
contributions of their partners were incentive-compatibly elicited in each round.4 
Contributions and guesses were submitted simultaneously.  
We considered two treatments in a between-subjects setting, information 
feedback being the treatment variable. In the information treatment (hereafter 
INFO), subjects received information feedback about payoffs from the public goods 
game, broken up to the sum of partners’ contributions, and from the guessing task 
after each round. In the control treatment (hereafter NoINFO), subjects received no 
information about payoffs and partners’ contributions until the end of the 
experiment.  
The experiment was computerized by Fischbacher’s (1999) z-Tree. In total 36 
inexperienced subjects participated (i.e., 18 subjects per treatment) who earned on 
average 18,300 Lira ≈ €9 ≈ $10.5 At the beginning, instructions were read and subjects 
went through four exercises. The experiment did not start until subjects had 
                                                           
4 Our scoring rule, which assumes symmetry of subjective distributions, induced payoffs equal to the 
square of 100 less the difference between the guess and partners’ contribution divided by 400. Thus, 
payoffs were in the interval [0;25].  
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answered all questions correctly. Thus, we are confident that the game and the 
incentives were understood. 
3 Experimental Results 
Table 1 records the voluntary contributions in percentages of the endowment and 
the guesses of the sum of partner’s contributions. Average contributions and guesses 
were significantly greater in NoINFO than in INFO.6 Initial contributions were the 
same in both treatments rejecting the hypothesis of strategic play by the 
participants, as that would likely involve higher contributions at the beginning to 
induce others to do the same. The main results follow, organized into six 
observations.  
 
Table 1. Average guesses and contributions
c 
   Round    All 
        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 10      Rounds
Contribution
c  NoINFO  39.2 45.0 44.1 48.2 45.6 37.3 37.1 43.6  27.1  46.7   41.4 
  INFO  35.2 33.9 28.3 24.0 15.8 32.8 20.2 21.4  18.2  14.1   24.4 
 Difference
a  4.0  11.1 15.8 24.2 29.8
* 4.6
** 16.9 22.1  8.9  32.6
**   17.0
* 
                   
Guess  NoINFO  47.3 51.8 48.8 54.3 57.2 49.6 53.6 41.2  48.2  58.1   51.0 
  INFO  43.4 40.6 37.1 34.7 28.0 39.4 29.2 25.1  27.6  21.3   32.6 
 Difference
a  3.9  11.3 11.8 19.7 29.2
* 10.2 24.4 16.1  20.6 36.8
**   18.4
* 
                    
Guess –   NoINFO
b  7.4 7.0 4.7 6.3  11.2
* 12.3 15.8
* -3.5 21.0
* 11.9   9.4
* 
Contribution
c  INFO 
b 8.1
* 6.2 7.9 9.9  11.6
* 6.1 8.6 2.9  9.7 7.9
*   7.9
* 
   Difference
a -0.7 0.8 -3.2 -3.6 -0.3 6.1 7.2 -6.3 11.4 4.0      1.4 
a. Two-tailed Mann-Whitney exact test (NoINFO #18; INFO #6); H0: λ(NoINFO)=λ(INFO).  
b. Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test (NoINFO #18; INFO #6); H0: Guess=Contribution
c. 




Observation 1. We observe a self-serving bias, in that the great majority of subjects 
(77.8%) contribute less than they expect their partners to contribute, with one’s 
contribution averaging 9.1% (INFO) and 7.7% (NoINFO) less than one’s guess. This 
evidence supports the conjecture of Fischbacher et al (2001) that people are 
                                                                                                                                                                          
5 A session took 70 minutes.  
Neugebauer Perote Schmidt Loos  5
motivated to avoid being a person who gives more than others. As the difference of 
contributions and guesses is a proxy for participants’ estimation error, it seems 
remarkable that there is no discernible downward trend. 
 
We propose four regression models to explain contributions and revealed 
expectations before we turn to a more in-depth analysis of round-to-round behavior. 
Let subject i’s contribution and the guess of the partners’ contributions in round t be 
denoted by contit and guessit. Models (1) and (2) involve regressions of contributions 
and of guesses on time.7 The outcomes are recorded in Table 2. 
 
Observation 2. While contributions and guesses decline when feedback is given 
about the partners’ contributions (INFO), contributions and guesses do not decline 
when no feedback is given (NoINFO).8 This follows from the recorded time 
coefficients and standard errors.  
 
Models (3) and (4) represent two alternative random effects regression 
models that provide a reasonable fit for both treatments, respectively. One’s guess 
and contribution, both the current and with a lag of one round, and the lagged 
average contribution of the other two group members (denoted by –i) are introduced 
as additional explicatory variables. Time becomes insignificant in these models. As 
the lagged average contribution was no available information in NoINFO, it is no 
surprise that the corresponding coefficient is also insignificant (see Table 2). In 
                                                                                                                                                                          
6 Croson (2000) reported similar contributions in a treatment comparable to INFO.  
7 We use the random effects model as applied in Croson (1998) and Croson et al (in press). We stratify by 
group in INFO and by individual i in NoINFO. 
8 The observation of no significant decline confirms Sell and Wilson (1991) who studied a no feedback 
setting without expectation elicitation.  
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INFO, others’ lagged contributions are highly significant for the determination of 
guesses, but not, in model (3), for contributions.9  
 
Observation 3. Guesses depend significantly on the lagged partners’ contributions. 
This implies that expectations in the feedback treatment are adapted from observed 
partners’ contributions. 
 
Observation 4. Individual contributions and guesses display path-dependence as 
they highly correlate with the individual contributions in the previous round, 
suggesting constant preferences over time. 
 
Observation 5. Contributions are strongly correlated with one’s guess in both 
treatments, clearly supporting the hypothesis of conditional contribution in the 
repeated public goods game.10 
 
Table 2. Random effects model results 
 NoINFO  INFO 
 Contit  Guessit  Contit  Guessit 
Model  (1) (3) (2) (4) (1) (3) (2) (4) 
R





** 0.482  -.995
** 7.702
* 
 (2.624)  (4.066)  (6.019)  (7.114) (2.931) (2.251)  (.295)  (3.863) 
Round t -0.311  -0.355  0.143  0.388  0.995
** -.100 -2.149
** -.248 
  (.352) (.362) (.590) (.640) (.295) (.254) (.488) (.573) 
Contit   -   0.576
**   -   1.099
** 
       (.134)      (.108) 
Guessit   0.185
**   -   0.364
**   - 
    (.043)      (.035)    
Conti,t-1   0.310
**   0.177  .391
**  -0.161 
   (.079)  (.145)  (.074)  (.139) 




   (.046)  (.077)  (.042)  (.072) 
Av. Cont-i,t-1   -0.113  -0.075  -0.049  0.474
** 
   (.096)  (.169)  (.035)  (.115) 
p<5%; 
** p<1%. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
                                                           
9 Others' lagged contributions are highly correlated to contributions. However, if one's guess on others' 
contributions is included in the regression they become insignificant. 
10 Also, subjects contribute significantly more the more they overestimate the others’ contributions.  
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Adopting the qualitative approach recently proposed by Keser and van 
Winden (2000), we expect subjects to weakly adapt their contribution by increasing 
or decreasing it when they observe that it was below or above the average 
contribution of their partners in the previous round, respectively. Table 3 records 
the frequencies of upward and downward adaptation of individual contributions. 
There is no discernible difference in adjustment behavior between INFO and 
NoINFO for the sample as a whole or restricted to below-average contributions.11 
 
Observation 6: A contribution decrease after an above-average contribution is 
significantly more likely when information feedback is given (INFO) than when it is 
not (NoINFO). This suggests a causal relationship between changes and the average 
contribution of the other group members, in line with the downward spiral 
explanation of contributions decrease over time. 
 
Table 3. Contribution changes between rounds t-1 and t
 
  Subject’s contribution in t-1 
    below average  above average  Average 
  Adaptation in t      
NoINFO  32 36  2 
 
# decrease 
(relative)  (36.0%) (52.2%)
 a (50.0%) 




 a  (29.0%) (0.0%) 
  # unchanged  14  13  2 
 
 
# total  90  68  4 
INFO  18 47  1 
 
# decrease 
(relative)  (22.5%) (72.3%)
 a (5.9%) 




 a (18.5%)  (23.5%) 
  # unchanged  28  6  12 
 
 
# total  80  65  17 
a. Contribution change proposed by Keser and van Winden (2000). 
                                                           
11 We ran tests on the surpluses of the number of predicted contribution changes over the non-predicted 
ones within and between treatments (INFO #6; NoINFO #18). The two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
favors Keser and van Winden’s hypothesis over random behavior in both treatments (p<.05). Between 
treatments, the two-tailed Mann Whitney exact test suggests significant [no significant] differences 
conditional on [below-average] above-average contributions in the previous round ([p=.673] p=.066) and 
no differences overall (p=.197), respectively.  
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4 Conclusions 
The present paper has intended to solve the puzzle of declining contributions in 
repeated public goods experiments. Our data encourage the suggestion of 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) that subjects do not want to contribute more to the public 
good than their partners, and that contributions appear to “spiral downwards” in the 
repeated setting (p. 403).  Participants’ contributions are highly significantly 
correlated to their expectations (though 8-9 percentage points lower), and 
contributions are significantly more frequently adapted when they exceed the 
contributions of others.12 Our observations suggest that one’s expectations about the 
contribution of others and one’s contributions are mutually correlated and the 




The authors thank Simon Gächter, Charles Holt, Vittoria Levati, Stefan Traub 
and Frans van Winden for helpful comments. Funding of the experiments by the 





                                                           
12 If subjects take a reference point in the average, the observed adaptation might lead to an analogy of 
loss aversion in decision making experiments (Schmidt and Traub, 2002).  
Neugebauer Perote Schmidt Loos  9
References 
Andreoni, J. (1988): ”Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods 
Experiments.” Journal of Public Economics 37, 291–304.  
Andreoni, J. (1995): “Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or 
Confusion?“ American Economic Review  85 (4): 891-904. 
Brandts, J. and Schram, A. (2001): “Cooperation and Noise in Public Goods 
Experiments: Applying the Contribution Function Approach.“ Journal of 
Public Economics 79 (2): 399-427.  
Brosig, J., Weimann, J., and Yang, C.-L. (2003): “The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a 
Simple Bargaining Experiment.” Experimental Economics 6, 75-90. 
Croson R. T. A. (1998): “Theories of Commitment, Altruism and Reciprocity: 
Evidence from Linear Public Goods Games.“ OPIM Working Paper, Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
Croson, R. T. A. (2000): “Thinking Like a Game Theorist: Factors Affecting the 
Frequency of Equilibrium Play.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organisation 
41: 299-314. 
Croson, R. T. A., Fatas, E. and Neugebauer, T. (in press). “Reciprocity, Matching and 
Conditional Cooperation in Two Public Goods Games.” Economics Letters.  
Fischbacher, U. (1999): “z-Tree – Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic 
Experiments.“ Working paper No. 21, University of Zurich. 
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. and Fehr, E. (2001): “Are People Conditionally 
Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment.“ Economics Letters 71 
(3): 397-404. 
Keser, C. and van Winden, F. (2000): “Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary 
Contributions to Public Goods.“ Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102: 23-39.   
Neugebauer Perote Schmidt Loos  10
Ledyard, J. O. (1995): “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.“ In 
Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel and A. Roth, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Levati, M. V. and Neugebauer, T. (2004): “An Application of the English Clock 
Market Mechanism to Public Goods Games.” Experimental Economics 7: 153-
164. 
Ockenfels, A. (1999). Fairness, Reziprozität und Eigennutz – ökonomische Theorie und 
experimentelle Evidenz. Die Einheit der Gesellschaftswissenschaften, Bd. 108, 
Tübingen Mohr Siebeck. 
Palfrey, T. and Prisbey, J. (1997): “Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods 
Experiments: How Much and Why.” American Economic Review, 87 (5), 829-
846. 
Schmidt, U. and Traub, S. (2002): “An Experimental Test of Loss Aversion.” Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty 25, 233-249 
Sell, J. and Wilson, R. (1991): “Levels of Information and Contributions to Public 
Goods.” Social Forces 70: 107-124. 
Sonnemans, J., Schram, A., and Offerman, T. (1999): “Strategic Behavior in Public 
Good Games: When Partners Drift Apart.“ Economics Letters 62: 35-41.  
Neugebauer Perote Schmidt Loos  11
Table A0. Individual guesses and contributionsa) 
 Round  NoINFO   Round  INFO 
ID  1  2  3  4  5  6789 1 0   1234  5  6  789 1 0
GUESS1  45 40 65 45 80 50 45 50 35 75   10 40 30 20 30  0 30 40 45 20
CONT1  40 40 60 80 80 20 50 40 20 80   20 40 30 10 20 24 30 20 40 20
                       
GUESS2  30 30 50 40 60 35 45 65 70 50   30 20 35 50 20 15 25 40 48 49
CONT2  30 10 30 20 40 30 20 60 40 50   20 16 20 30 14 16 20 30 24 24
                       
GUESS3  80 80 85 60 75 85 85 80 60 85   50 40 30 20 10  100 50 40 30 20
CONT3  30 40 70 40 50 56 56 36 20 48   50 40 30 20 10  100  100 80 60 40
                       
GUESS4  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20   30 45 60 80 85 45 50 35 55 35
CONT4  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20   50 60 100 80 40 20 20 40 10 10
                       
GUESS5  65 80 75 85 65 95 75 80 86 69   20 30 28 40 10 29 38 20 40 20
CONT5  60 70 40 70 60 70 80 70 86 60   10 20 0 40  0 30 10 10 0 20
                       
GUESS6  50 80 50 25 50 50 50 50 50 50   75 75 75 100 50 90 30 75 75 40
CONT6  50 50 50  100 50 50 50 50 50 50   50 50 100 100 60 60 20 80 50 20
                       
GUESS7  43 60 39 80 38 59 68 0 80 96   75 60 50 65 80  100 75 60 28 28
CONT7  46 98 70 60 68 52 100 94 68 30   50 30 20 40 60  100 50 30 0 0
                       
GUESS8  50 75 80 70 50 40 35 20 25 20   30 75 35 28 60 55 50 35 55 20
CONT8  0 60 60 30 20  0 10 0 20 20   10 84 16 4 20 70 40 60 30 0
                       
GUESS9  50 70 25 50 80 40 100 30 20 50   50 50 50 50 29 33 50 35 35 30
CONT9  40  0 20  0 14 10 0 20 12 16   50 50 50 0 14 20 40 20 22 20
                       
GUESS10 50 45 55  100 75 50 50 40 40 50   20 40 40 15 20  0  0000
CONT10  50 50 30  100 70 20 30 20 20 50   4000  0  0  0000
                       
GUESS11 50 15 45 62 40 29 56 10 30 60   100 50 25 19 25 25 25 25 23 0
C O N T 1 1   4 0  3 0  4 6  2 6  5 2  6 0 4 4 3 0 1 06   1 0 0 5 000   0   0   0000
                       
G U E S S 1 2  6 0  7 5  4 0  8 0  7 5  5 0 6 5 5 7 8 0 7 8   5 0 5 0 2 5 2 5   0  5 0   0000
C O N T 1 2   6 0  8 0  7 0  4 0   0  6 6 5 0 8 0 6 8 4 0   5 0 5 0 4 0 5 0   0  5 0   0000
                       
GUESS13 50 60 50  0  100 80 10 50 100 100   20 20 16 30 25 25 10 0 31 3
CONT13  60 60 80 50  100 80 20 100 0 64   20 20 16 30 26 24  2022
                       
GUESS14 50 40 50 60 20 30 50 20 25 50   45 30 30 20 18 18 18 15 10 8
CONT14  20 40 20 30 40 60 0 0 10 100   40 20 40 2 10  6  0 10 10 8
                       
GUESS15 95 80 80 94 89 88 91 66 94 75   45 35 25 35 25 20 20 15 13 6
C O N T 1 5   9 6  8 0  6 0  9 6  9 6  7 0 1 0 0 9 0 2 4 9 0   1 0 1 0 2 0 1 0  1 0  1 0   0000
                       
G U E S S 1 6   4   3  1 0   7  1 7  1 2 2 0923   6 0 4 0 2 5 1 7   7  5 0   573 2 5
C O N T 1 6   4  2  8  6  0  88406   4 0 5 046  0   4 0  260 2 0
                       
GUESS17 40 50 20 60 45 30 50 40 20 80   60 30 28 10  5  5 30 5 5 30
CONT17  30 50 20 60 40  0 10 40 0 60   60 20 24 10  0 20 30 0 40 20
                       
GUESS18 20 30 40 40 50 50 50 55 30 35   12 0 60 0  5 50 20 5 0 50
C O N T 1 8   3 0  3 0  4 0  4 0  2 0   0 2 0 3 0 2 0 5 0   0000   0   0   00 4 0 5 0
a) Percentage-contributions relative to endowment  
Neugebauer Perote Schmidt Loos  12
Instructions (Translated from Italian) 
1)  You will participate in 10 Rounds of a Group Decision-Making Experiment, in which you 
will interact with (always the same) two partners, whose identity will not be revealed to 
you at any time. 
2)  In every Round you (as well as your partners) will receive an initial endowment of 50 
ECU (1 ECU = 25 Lire), and you have to decide how much of this amount to contribute 
to a Group Project and a remainder to an Individual Project. Any ECU contributed to the 
Group Project will generate Payoff for you as well as for each of your partners. The 
remainder of your endowment that you do not contribute to the Group Project will be 
saved in your Individual Project, which generates payoff only to you. 
3)  Your PAYOFF FROM THE GROUP DECISION in a Round will be determined as 
follows: 
0.5 x Group Project + your Individual Project. 
4)  During the entire experiment you will not receive any information about the other group 
members’ contribution to the Group Project. 
5)  However, you will be asked to guess the sum of the partners’ contribution. In each Round 
you have to enter your Guess about this sum, i.e., a number between 0 and 100. Your 
PAYOFF FROM GUESSING will be determined as follows (in ECU): 




Note: the closer your Guess is to the sum of contributions of your partners the higher is 
your payoff. To calculate proceed as follows: 
Calculate first the difference between your Guess and the sum of your partners’ 
contributions. If this sum is 
1. positive calculate the difference between 100 and this result. 
2. negative calculate the sum between 100 and this result.  
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Then calculate the square of this difference and divide it by 400. 
At the end of the experiment you will be told and paid the sum of payoffs (converted into Lire) 
you received during the experiment. This includes the payoffs from the Group Decision as well 
as from Guessing. 
  
Exercises (translated from Italian) 
Exercise 1: a) How much Payoff does every group member receive from the Group Decision in 
a Round in which none of them contributes anything to the Group Project?  
b) How much Payoff does a group member receive if she or he submits a guess of 0, 50 or 
100? 
Exercise 2: a) How much Payoff does every group member receive from the Group Decision in 
a Round in which every member contributes the entire endowment (50ECU) to the Group 
Project? b) How much Payoff does a group member receive if she or he submits a guess 
of 0, 50 or 100? 
Exercise 3: a) How much Payoff does every group member receive from the Group Decision in 
a Round in which the lowest contribution to the Group Project is 0 ECU, the median-
contribution is 25ECU and the highest-contribution is 50 ECU? 
Exercise 4: a) How much Payoff does every group member receive from the Group Decision in 
a Round in which the lowest contribution to the Group Project is 0, the median 
contribution is 1 ECU and the highest contribution is 2 ECU? 
Please make your calculation on this sheet. (Hint: calculate first the Group Project, than the 
Individual Project for each member. Next calculate the absolute value of the difference between 
your Guess and the sum of the others’ contribution) 